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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the joint dynamics of the segmentation of society into communities and
the growth process using a simple human capital growth model. Using coalition theory, we prove that
in each period, “growth clubs” form. We investigate the socio-economic dynamics of society over time,
characterize it and prove that there exists a steady state partition of society, which may be segmented.
Then, there is no absolute and general convergence in income levels. We then study these process for
diﬀerent initial inequality patterns.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The relationship between inequality and the growth process is now well researched by economists, in partic-
ular after the development of endogenous growth theory (see Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa, 1999, for
a survey on this). The dynamics between the two is less understood. The Kuznets curve as a stylized fact
m a k e sc l e a rt h a tt h e r ei ss o m ei n t e r d e p e n d e n c eb e t w e e nt h et w oa n dt h a ta ts o m ee a r l ys t a g eo ft h eg r o w t h
process, inequality acts as a fuel for growth, whereas at latter stages, a reduction in the growth process tends
to homogenize society and reduce inequality. But this view is still in need of a theory.
The aim of the present paper is to develop a theory of the joint dynamics of inequality and growth.
We want to prove how the endowment distribution and the growth pattern of an economy interdependently
change over time. The growth pattern relates to the distribution of individual growth rates in a given
period. In a given period, the existing inequality schedule impinges on the growth pattern; in turn this
pattern aﬀects the way agents accumulate capital and therefore the endowment distribution for the next
period. This interaction comes through the existence over time of “temporary” growth clubs, coming to life
because the growth mechanism relies on the productive feature of a club good: The individual accumulation
of human capital for an individual in a given club at a given period depends on the level of the club good.
Hence the characteristics of a temporary club aﬀect the individual accumulation of human capital and matters
for the individual transmission by members of the club of human capital to their forebears. Growth clubs
may grow at diﬀerent rates because each club produces a speciﬁc amount of the club good. This implies that
the endowment distribution changes over time, because of the way growth clubs form and human capitals
diﬀerentially accumulate in each period.
The way growth clubs form in each period appears crucial. Assuming that there is no intertemporal
commitment over club formation, clubs form when a period opens and dissolve at the end of each period.
In each period, agents have an incentive to form clubs. Here we explicitly endogenize the formation of
these clubs by individual agents, relying on coalition theory. This means that the economy is continuously
segmented and that the process of segmentation itself evolves over time. In this sense we can talk about a
social dynamics, that is the evolution of segmentation into communities or clubs over time because individuals
are free to form new communities at each period.
Here we develop a model where the economic dynamic properties of the economy (the evolution of
the endowment distribution and the growth pattern) is intertwined with the social dynamics, both being
grounded on explicit individual optimizing behavior.
The functioning of the economy is as follows. Agents live for one period, and care about the legacy left
to their oﬀspring, because of a "joy-of-giving" motive (there is no population growth, nor uncertainty: each
agent is succeeded by another agent). In each period, agents inherite an individual amount of human capital
from their forebears which aﬀects their own income. The production of human capital in this period depends
on the production of a "club good". Hence agents are induced to form clubs. As generations do not last,
clubs do not last either. At the beginning of each period clubs form, and are disbanded at the end of it.
As a result, in each period society is segmented into clubs and that segmentation does not last. Given the
accumulation of human capital through time, there is growth in the sense that individual incomes grow over
2time. Since there is heterogeneity among agents, tthe growth patterns are speciﬁc to each family and the
growth process itself is marked by heterogeneity. The formation of clubs depends on the rational interest of
individuals: individuals must be willing to enter a club and be accepted into this club by its other members.
These decisions depends on two factors: congestion costs and wealth. Any additional member creates a
congestion eﬀect as the more numerous a club is, the less eﬃcient the provision process of the club good
is; therefore an agent must be able to contribute enough to the provision of the club good to be accepted .
Given the inequality in individual human capitals, it means that not any agent is welcome in a given club:
he must be rich enough to overcome the congestion eﬀect and be accepted by its members. Hence inequality
leads to social segmentation into clubs. As clubs produce a club good, which matters for the growth of
human capital, the growth process in any period depends on the human capital distribution inherited from
the previous period. In turn, the growth process leads to a new distribution which itself will impact on the
next period’s growth process.
Because of the formation of clubs, that is social clusters of individual and their economic eﬀects on the
growth process, we witness a joint dynamics of growth, social segmentation and inequality.
Given the interaction over time of the social and the economic dimensions developed in the model, we
can address several issues:
• The partition of the economy and the growth pattern for a given period: how clubs form in each
period? Can we characterize the partition? What are its impacts on the growth process?
• The dynamics of the partition and of the growth pattern over time: how do they evolve? Can we have
periods during which there is a reduction in the fragmentation of the society and a correlated reduction
in growth diﬀerentials over agents, followed by periods of increasing fragmentation and widening of
the economic gaps between agents? Under which circumstances, do we obtain a monotonous process
of joint reduction in social fragmentation and inequality? What can we say about the convergence
process? Is there a steady state in this economy.
We are able to address these questions and prove that in each period, an equilibrium exists with a
partition belonging to the core of the economy. It does not imply that the grand coalition form nor that
there be a global and systematic reduction in human capital. It makes unlikely that except under special
circumstances, a convergence process takes place over time.
Despite the complex dynamics of club formation and human capital accumulation, we are able to prove
that any economy whatever its initial human capital distribution eventually establishes a permanent parti-
tion, that is that clubs’ borders do not move, even though clubs are recomposed again and again. Then, this
leads to full convergence within a club but not between clubs (again, except for some initial distributions
and parameter values). If there is more than one club, it must be that there is income and human capital
divergence among agents.
Finally, after studying particular types of initial human capital accumulation which helps us to better un-
derstand the functioning of this economy, we cannot establish a monotonous relationship between inequality
and growth. We explain this absence of a non ambiguous relationship between more inequality and more/less
3growth, now well documented empirically (see Benabib, 2003), by the fact that inequality is not the sole
factor aﬀecting growth, but that other factors like congestion costs and therefore social segmentation play a
crucial role in the growth process.
The present paper shares a common perspective with a previous paper co-written with Fernando Jaramillo
(Jaramillo, Kempf, Moizeau, forthcoming). In this paper too, we addressed the link between inequality and
growth, oﬀering the notion of "growth clubs" and proving their existence, when it is considered that they
endogenously form. A growth club is a cluster of individuals bonding together as they share a common
resource, which makes them grow together. It was assumed that individuals would live forever and clubs
would form at the beginning of time and forever, and that within each club, a club good would be provided
once-and-for-all. Hence we proved that the initial distribution of capital aﬀects the entire growth process
over time, through the partitioning of the society, and that convergence could not be taken for granted once
we consider this segmentation. But there was no feedback from growth to inequality as there is no periodic
reshuﬄing of the partition of society.
Here we enrich the picture as we are able to exhibit a much more complex and two-way process. In the
present paper, we exploit and prove the existence of growth clubs. However here, they are temporary clubs
as they form and disband in each period. It is this precise characteristics which uncovers the joint dynamics
of inequality and growth that we could not obtain in the previous paper: as the borders of clubs (a priori)
move over time, the human capital accumulation distribution is reshuﬄed over time. As a result, inequality
dynamics is aﬀected by growth and vice-versa.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the following section we set up the model. In section 3, we prove,
characterize the equilibrium attained in period t and study its properties. Then in section 4, we study the
dynamic sequence of these equilibria, proving that a steady state exists, with both a permanent core partition
of the economy and a steady-state growth pattern. In section 5, we study this dynamics for various types of
endowment distributions. Section 6 concludes.
2 The economy
We consider a model of successive generations of individuals. There is no demographic growth and we assume
that each individual lives one period and has a unique oﬀspring so that the population is of constant size
N. In each period, the society is formed of N individuals S = {1,...,N}. At date t =0 , each individual is
endowed with a level of human capital hi
0. Agents are ordered so that h1
0 >h 2
0 >. . . .>h N
0 . As we shall see,
since agents leave bequests to their child, we deﬁne hi
t as the human capital endowed to agent i living in t
by her parent.
Individuals diﬀer only according to their human capital endowment. Agents’ preferences are the same.
For any individual born at date t, preferences depend on private consumption ci








Each individual is endowed by 1 unit of time. (1−µ) is the fraction of time devoted to education and µ
is the fraction of time devoted to work. For simplicity, µ is assumed to be constant. We assume an aggregate




t. This implies hi
t equals the hourly wage wi
t and thus the income
of individual i is yi
t = µhi
t. The consumption level is equal to the after-tax net income.
Agents are willing to form or join a club because a club provides a productive club good. More precisely,
for each individual i belonging to the j− club C
j














t the level of public good in club C
j
t. Moreover, we assume κ>0,β∈ (0,1) so that all factors
exhibit diminishing returns. There is no inter-club externality and G
j
t is actually a club good. The amount
of human capital left to any oﬀspring depends both on the amount of education provided by her parents
and the level of the club good. The quality of education itself depends on the available individual human
capital. The club good (a “school”) helps a member of the club to form more human capital. The club good
is ﬁnanced by a proportional tax rate τ
j
t w h i c hi sl e v i e do nm e m b e r s ’i n c o m e s .T h et a xr a t eτ
j
t is speciﬁct o

















The public good is ﬁnanced through a tax levied on the labor income but the provision technology is
hampered by congestion eﬀects, captured by A(n
j
t). W ea s s u m et h a tA0(n
j
t) > 0 and that A(n
j
t) is a log-
convex function.1 Importantly, congestion costs are anonymous. The harm inﬂicted by other members of
a club to any individual member is related to the mere number of them, not to their precise identity or
characteristics.2
As agents may willingly form clubs, at any date t the society S may be partitioned:
Deﬁnition 1. A nonempty subset C
j




t } for j =1 ,...,J













t = ∅ for j 6= j.0
We do not impose that clubs form for more than one period. Hence a partition is deﬁned for a given








the number of individuals belonging to C
j
t.
Finally, capital markets are incomplete: Agents cannot borrow and lend freely so as to alter their decision
to accumulate human capital.
3 The core partition at time t.







, the functioning of the economy is sequential:
1This property will prove useful for the proof of uniqueness.
2Given the ﬁxed mode of ﬁnancing the club good, there is no free-rider eﬀect, contrarily to the model we previously developed.
See JKM (2003 and forthcoming).
51. In the ﬁrst stage, clubs form. This implies some agreement over the membership, the amount of public
good to be provided by its members and the tax rate to be chosen by the constituency formed by the
sole members of the club. The tax rate chosen within a club is decided through a simple majority rule.
2. Then, in the second stage, individuals produce by allocating their time between labor and education
and they leave bequests to their forebear in the next period. Here the individual behaviour is rather
passive as the fraction of time devoted to education is exogenous.
The game is in the same spirit as the games studied by JKM (2003 and forthcoming).3 However, here
there is no uncooperative behavior, given that individual behaviour is rather passive and the fraction of time
devoted to education is exogenous. As the human capital technology does not allow for any economy-wide
spillovers, the club-formation game we will focus on is thus a club-formation game without spillovers between
clubs.
We shall prove the existence of an equilibrium when agents form clubs and will use the following deﬁni-
tions:
Deﬁnition 2: A core partition b Ct =
n
b C1














denotes the utility for agent i associated with partition b Ct.
A c c o r d i n gt ot h i sd e ﬁnition, a partition belongs to the core when it is immune against any club deviation,
i.e., no member of the deviating group obtains more than what he is currently getting in the partition.
Deﬁnition 3. At date t,
·
b Ct = {b C1












is an equilibrium if it satisﬁes:
(i) b τ
j
t is chosen in club b C
j

















(ii) b Ct belongs to the core of the coalition-formation game.
According to this deﬁnition, the equilibrium we are looking for is such that in each club, the provision
of the public good is fully ﬁnanced, and no agent has any interest to propose or to accept a defection
from any club, as the partition belongs to the core. A strong implication of this is that the equilibrium is
Pareto-optimal.
Solving backwards allows us to characterize the equilibrium as follows:
Proposition 1. At date t, the equilibrium exists and is characterized by the following:
(i) The tax rate in club is chosen by the median voter and is equal to:
b τ
j




3It has also been used by Barham et al. (1997).
6(ii) The indirect utility V i(b C
j
t) for individual i belonging to b C
j

































¢1−β + ρβ lnµ(
ρβ
1+ρβ).
(iii) The core partition b Ct is unique and consecutive, that is if i and e i both belong to b C
j
t,t h e n∀i∗,
i>i ∗ >e i, i∗ ∈ b C
j
t.
(iv) Welfare ordering: Consider two individuals such that i0 >i , i0 ∈ b C
j0
t and i ∈ b C
j
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Given the consecutivity property of the core partition, it amounts to say that the b n1
t richest agents form
the club b C1
t , the next b n2
t richest agents form the club b C2
t , etc.
Remark that the core partition is obtained for a given period. Given the bequests left by agents to their
forebears, the inequality schedule a priori changes from period to period, a priori generating a diﬀerent core
partition at each period. This explains why the various characteristics of a core partition (except the tax
rate) are indexed with a subscript t. Now we adopt the convention that clubs are indexed according to the














,u s i n g
(7) the human capital hi



























It will prove useful to adopt the following convention. Consider two clubs b C
j
t and b C
j0
t . We rank clubs





t ), for i ∈ b C
j
t and i0 ∈ b C
j0
t , then j<j 0.
Proposition 1 and in particular (6) allow us to oﬀer a simple characterization of the core partition valid
for date t:
Proposition 2. ∀t, b Ct = {b C1






































































A pivotal agent is the poorest agent of a club b C
j
t. Her human capital endowment is just suﬃcient for
her to contribute minimally but enough to cover the additional congestion costs she inﬂicts on the other
7members. The next agent, just after the pivotal agent, who is poorer is unable to cover these costs, and so is
not accepted by the members of b C
j
t. The number of clubs Jt is indexed with time as it may vary over time.
The last club b C
Jt
t is called the “residual” club. Its size is not “optimal” as its pivotal agent is the last agent,
so that the last inequality has no meaning for this club.
4 The core partition and the convergence issue.
Given the segmentation put in place in a given period, what are its economic consequences in terms of growth
and inequality? This is the ﬁrst step of the analysis of the socio-economic dynamics of this economy. It is
important as, in the next period, the partition will depend on the current income distribution.
4.1 Intra-club convergence
First we can prove that within any club formed in a given period, there is intra-club convergence: the
diﬀerences between members are reduced. For the equilibrium at t, from (2) and (5), the individual-human-
capital growth rate for an agent i who belongs to b C
j































: quite sensibly, for any individual, the
richer is the club she belongs to, the higher is the level of the club good she beneﬁts from, and the higher is
the human capital she bequests to her child. But remark also that it is increasing in the ratio between the
aggregate wealth and the individual current human capital: the poorer is a member, the more she beneﬁts
from the club good. Finally, it is decreasing in the size of the club b n
j
t : this is due to congestion costs which
depress the eﬃciency of the production of the club good for a given amount of collected taxes.
We give some properties of the core-partition of a given period t and its consequences on growth in the
following:











, ∀i,i0 ∈ b C
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t,∀t.





The point (i) states that there is convergence in human capital/endowment between members of a given
club. This comes directly from the fact that inputs in the human capital technology exhibit diminishing
returns. This leads a poorer agent in a club to beneﬁt more from the club good than a richer member and
thus to accumulate relatively more rapidly human capital. However this is not true between individuals
8b e l o n g i n gt od i ﬀerent clubs as there may be a divergence among clubs. Consider two individuals i and i0
with i0 >i, i ∈ b C
j
t and i0 ∈ b C
j0































which cannot be ruled out. As a consequence, even if the gap between two agents who belong to the same
club at t reduces, it may increase in the sequel: because their oﬀspring may belong in the future to diﬀerent
clubs. A priori there is no reason to expect that if at t, i and i0 b e l o n gt oac l u bb C
j
t, the individual with the
same ranking (their oﬀspring) will necessarily belong to the club b C
j
t+1.
Point (ii) states that there may be a catching-up mechanism at work over time, but that it can never lead
to an inversion of the ranking. If at 0,iis richer than i0, then i ’o ﬀsprings will always remain at least as rich
as i0 ’s oﬀspring. This is due to the obvious fact, that in absolute levels, in any period, a richer individual




t diﬀers between individuals, even if they belong to the same club. Denoting by h
j
t the
average level of human capital for club b C
j
t, we denote by γ
j
t the growth rate of the average level of human



















































For sake of simplicity, we refer to γ
j
t as the club j’s growth rate.4 We use γ
j
t as a convenient index of
the whole process of growth characterizing a club in the core partition. Given what we said above on the
inexistence of a systematic process of individual catching-up in human capital over time, it is immediate to
deduce that a priori there cannot be either a systematic process of catching-up between clubs. That is, we














, ∀j<j 0. Actually, we have no reason to suspect that the number
of clubs will decrease or increase or remain constant.
Phases of catching up and increasing gaps can alternate. If there is a long enough period of inter-
club catching-up, sooner or later, the partition will change. But in turn this will aﬀect the dynamics of
accumulation and may end the catching-up process, at least temporarily.
4γ
j
t is not the average of individual growth rates for individuals belonging to b C
j
t due to the non-linearities at work in this
economy. But we will see later that, in the long run, the growth rate γ
j




9Still, interestingly, despite the complexity of the dynamics in this model, there is a direction towards
stationarity, as we shall see in the next section.
4.2 Permanent core-partition
We want to know whether given the above characteristics of the socio-economic dynamics, there is still some
form of stationary state?
Such a steady state has both a social and an economic dimensions. On the one hand, it must be
characterized by some form of permanency in the fragmentation of society: we have seen that a change in
the partition over time signiﬁcantly alters the dynamics of accumulation, of inequality and of growth. On
the other hand, it must also be characterized by some form of balancedness in the growth pattern, which in
turn implies some permanency in human capital distribution, that is inequality. It is important to insist on
the fact that the steady state is not inconsistent with fragmentation, that is the presence of several clubs.
If it turns out that the the steady state partition involves more than one club, then clubs grow at diﬀerent
rate depending on the level of human capital of their members.
As the stability of the partition is a precondition for obtaining a steady state growth pattern, we can say
that it will be reached before any steady state growth pattern. There may exist a given date t∗ such that
from t onwards, the core partition does not change anymore: all pivotal agents remain the same over time.
We refer to this partition as the t∗ − permanent partition and we oﬀer the following:
Deﬁnition 3. A core partition b C is said to be t∗ − permanent when starting at a given date t∗,
b Ct = b C,∀t ≥ t∗.
Addressing the issue of the convergence toward a dynamically stable segmentation of the economy, we
can prove the following:
Proposition 4. For any society, there always exists a unique ﬁnite date t∗ such that a permanent core
partition forms.
Proof: See appendix.
This is a rather surprising result, given the a priori complexity of the dynamics. Actually, we cannot say
much about the transition path toward the t∗ − permanent core partition: clubs may increase or decrease
in size over time, except the ﬁrst club which can only weakly expand. The intuition underlying is as follows.
First, we know that at any date t, due to the welfare ordering property of the core partition (see item (iv)
of Proposition 1), individuals in the ﬁrst club get the highest level of welfare. Second, from the intra-club
human capital convergence process at work (see item (i) of Proposition 3), individuals in the richest club
become progressively more similar, thus increasing their willingness to interact in the same club. Hence, the
ﬁrst club can be modiﬁed over time only because new members are accepted.
However, the proposition makes clear that this process, unless special circumstances, does not go toward
the eventual disappearance of any social fragmentation, that is the creation of the grand coalition: at a given
period, the society necessarily reaches a stable partition, which in general, will imply several clubs. This will
become apparent in the sequel.
Importantly, once the t∗ − permanent core partition has formed, this does not mean that the economic
10side as such has reached the steady-state. At t∗, once the memberships have stabilized, individuals will still
diﬀer and there will still be a growing process which has no reason to be steady. Actually, we can prove that
the economy will ultimately converge to a steady-state growth pattern.
In the following, variables without a subscript t refer to the t∗ − permanent core partition. Let us
characterize the t∗ − permanent core partition by the following:
Proposition 5. (i) Whithin clubs belonging to the t∗ − permanent core partition, there is eventually





t, ∀i ∈ b Cj.
(ii) The growth rate of the average level of human capital of the club b Cj, is constant over time and such
that:







(iii) If the t∗ − permanent core partition is composed by more than one club (i.e. the grand coalition
does not form), then there is no inter-club convergence in growth rate:
γj
γj0 ≥ 1,∀j<j 0 <J .
Proof: See appendix.
Point (i) is easy to understand. Once the core partition has formed, the intra-club convergence logically
leads to full homogeneity: this is due to the fact that the club good, club knowledge, is relatively more
eﬃcient for lesser endowed agents than for richer ones. Of course, eventually, within a club, the growth rate
for any individual capital accumulation is equal to the club growth rate γj.
Point (ii) states that, even if the growth pattern is balanced, the growth rates of clubs are not necessarily
equal across clubs. This is due to the fact that in the t∗ −permanent core partition, the sizes of clubs may
diﬀer. When time passes, given the intra-club convergence property, these diﬀerences in sizes imply that the
eﬃciency of the club good in fostering capital accumulation and therefore growth are in the limit the only
factor of diﬀerenciation. If they do diﬀer, the steady-state growth rates diﬀer.
Point (iii) states that the fragmentation of the core partition is inconsistent with any general and aggregate
catching up process. This is understandable: if there were a steady state catching up process of richer clubs
by poorer ones, eventually the poorer agents would be at least as rich as the richer agents, and the condition of
fragmentation, given by the inequalities deﬁning the pivotal agents would not be met. Hence, in a fragmented
t∗−permanent core partition, the richer clubs grow at least as fast as the poorer ones. Despite the intra-club
homogeneity, there is a tendency to inter-club, that is aggregate, divergence, at least in endowments (if the
growth rates are equal), and even in growth rates.
5 Particular inequality schedules
In this section, we emphasize the fact that in such a framework, inequality dynamics may exhibit diﬀerent
history-dependent steady states. However, along the transitional path, the interplay between human capital
11accumulation and fragmentation can lead to complex inequality dynamics. Potentially, as long as human
distribution evolves, the core partition can change. Multiple trajectories can then arise making diﬃcult an
analysis aiming to predict the t∗ − permanent core partition that would emerge depending on the initial
pattern of human capital inequality. So we shall consider particular inequality schedules and show the
characteristics of the resulting steady state core partition.









. Then we deﬁne an inequality schedule as follows:









































































































5.1 The case of initial constant inter-individual inequality ratio.
First, let us focus on an inequality schedule such that λ
i,i+1
0 = λ, ∀i ∈ S. This special case means that the
initial endowment ratio between two successive individuals does not depend on their exact ranking in the
distribution. In the case of static core-partition, JKM remark that this implies that the arbitrage condition
is the same for any individual, and that this leads to equal sized clubs. Here we can enlarge the analysis and
prove the following
Proposition 6. (i) When at date t =0 , a society S is characterized by an inequality schedule S =
{λ0,...,λ0,...,λ0},t h e nt h e0 − permanent core partition exists.
(ii) It is such that n
j
t = b n,∀j,t, and γ
j
t = b γt,∀j;
(iii) An increase of the ratio λ leads a core-partition wih clubs the size of which cannot increase. Similarly,
an increase in congestion (a steeper A(.)) leads a core-partition wih clubs the size of which cannot increase.
Proof. See appendix.
The two ﬁrst properties mean that the core-partition immediately forms with equal sized clubs. At period
0,the initial partition forms and due to the fact that the arbitrage conditions for any individual are the same,
clubs of equal size form in the core-partition.
Since any individual beneﬁts in the same way of the club externality, each individual human capital grows
at the same rate, and following Proposition 5 club growth rates are equal. This precludes any catching up
process. The inequality schedule keeps the same property of constant gaps across agents from period 0 to
period 1.
12Hence in period 1, the problem of the equilibrium is just the same as in period 1. Levels of human capital
have changed but the decisions to form clubs are based on the ratio λ. Therefore this explains why the same
partition forms again in period 1.
This argument can be reproduced sequentially, period after period, and clubs after clubs. This explains
why the permanent core-partition forms immediately, in period 0.
As about the third property, it is diﬃcult to assess the impact of an increase in λ as we do not reason
with a continuum of agents. However the result is easy to understand. Any agent is willing to accept a poorer
agent if she is able to contribute enough to the club good. The less diﬀerence in human capital and thus,
in taxing capabilities, the better it is. An increase in inequality (in λ) m e a n st h a ti ti sm o r ed i ﬃcult for a
relatively poor agent to be accepted by richer agents. Consequently, it leads to a (weakly) more segmented
society.
Similarly, an steeper congestion cost function may be interpreted as an increase in congestion: an increase
in the size of a club, ceteris paribus, makes the production process of the club good less eﬃcient, and reduces
the appeal of accepting an additional agent in the club. This means that an increase in the curvature of the
cost function leads to a (weakly) more segmented society.








Finally, we remark that, when at date t =0 , a society S is characterized by an inequality schedule
S = {λ0,...,λ0,...,λ0},a n dλ0 <λ
∗
0,t h e nt h eg r a n dc o a l i t i o nf o r m s .λ
∗










If inequality, as measured in this case by λ0, is not too large, then there is no segmentation and the entire
economy forms a single club. Again, this illustrates the fact that what matters for any individual is the
relative ability to contribute of any one poorer than himself. Hence if the poorest agent in the economy is
not "too far down" the richest agent, given the congestion costs, he will be able to overcome these costs and
be accepted by the richest agent in his club. Hence the grand coalition forms.
5.2 The case of increasing inter-individual inequality ratios




0 , ∀i ∈ S. Such a series of
inequalities corresponds to an increasing gap between two successive agents with their ranking in the initial
distribution: two successive rich agents are "closer" than two successive poorer agents. GKM study this case
in the static environment sharing some crucial properties with the present one. They prove that a richer
clubs are larger than a poorer club: the club size decreases with the ranking of a club. Again this comes from
the fact that the more alike two agents are, the more likely they are to accept each other, because the richer
of them knows that the poorer has enough capacity to contribute to his own beneﬁt .T h es a m ep r o p e r t yi s
at work here as well and so we can show the following











0 , ∀i ,t h e nt h e0 − permanent core partition exists.





(iii) More congestion implies lower club size at any period.
Proof. See appendix.
Again the striking result is that the permanent core-partition forms immediately. This can be explained
as follows/; As in JKM, at period 0,a partition forms with the ﬁrst club being the largest and the richest.
The second club can therefore not compensate by a larger size, meaning coalizing more people, the fact that
it is formed of poorer people. Hence it grows less rapidly in period 0, and the inequality ratio between the
club 1’s pivotal agent and the richest agent in club 2 increases from period 0, to period 1. As a consequence,
being farther away from this agent, he still cannot meet the condition for being accepted in club 1. And
club 1 does not increase in size from period 0 to period 1. Can it shrink in size. Again no, because inside
this club, there is a catching-up process: the pivotal agent in period 1 gets closer to the richest agent than
he was in period 0. Hence, he still meets the condition for being accepted in the ﬁrst club (remember that
they are based on relative human capitals, nor on the absolute levels).
Repeat the argument for any two successive clubs at any period and this explains why the permanent
core-partition forms immediately.
The last property is explained as before and does not need any further comment.
Of course, the ﬁrst club grows more rapidly than any other club in any period but it is not true that the
growth rate is constant over time and across clubs, as in the previous case. This comes from the fact that
given the . But by direct application of Proposition 1, we know that limγ
j





and γj >γ j+1, ∀j, from (11). Not only is there no convergence in levels of human capital i.e. in income,
but there is a strict ranking in growth rates as well, unlike in the previous case. The steady-state implies
ever-diverging trajectories in human capital accumulation. This comes from the fact that, since richer clubs
are bigger, the growth engine is more eﬃcient for these clubs.
5.3 The case of decreasing inter-individual inequality ratios
Third, let us consider now an initial inequality schedule such that λi,i+1,0 >λ i+1,i+2,0, ∀i ∈ S. Such a series
of inequalities means that the further "up" in the initial distribution we are, the more heterogeneity there
is between two successive persons. The more dissimilar (in terms of available human capital) two successive
agents are, the richer they are. In the static case studied by JKM, they proved that the poorer clubs were the
larger. Again, this is an application of the fact that in this type of environment, the clubs form according to
a logic of homogeneity. A decrease in human capital diﬀerences, corresponding to more homegeneity, leads
to larger clubs. So now, the two elements, size and individual wealth, have a conﬂicting role, whereas in
the previous case, they played in the same direction. Now a poorer club may overcome the fact that it is
formed with poorer agents by the fact that it coalizes many of them. As a result, it may happen that the
club good is larger in a poorer club (a club formed of poorer agents) and then the growth engine played
by this good is more powerful: the growth rate of a poorer club may be larger than the growth rate of a
richer club. Hence, it may happen that from one period to another, the richest agent in a given club who
could not be accepted in a richer club, now is able to be accepted. Hence, there is no reason to believe that
14the permanent core-partition can be formed immediately when the initial inequality schedule exhibits this
characteristics of increasing inequality ratios. Actually we can formally prove the following











0 , ∀i ,t h ed a t et∗ at which the permanent core partition
establishes may be bigger than 0.
Proof: see Appendix.
The fact that some catching-up process can take place over time, does not entail that the grand coalition
necessarily forms when the inequality schedule satisﬁes this property of decreasing inequality ratios. This can
be seen by a continuity argument from the case of constant inequality ratios. Basically, we have to conclude
that for this case, the dynamics may be quite complex, given the contradicting roles played by club size and
individual wealth of the membership.
5.4 Comparing economic performances for diﬀerently unequal societies
Up to now, we studied the consequences on segmentation and growth of the steepness of the initial human
capital distribution. We are also interested in the comparison both in terms of segmentation and growth of
two societies diﬀering in terms of "inequality". In other words, we want to address the hotly debated issue of
the relationship between inequality and growth, but with the idea of introducing social fragmentation as a
key causal element in this relationship: is a more unequal growing more (or less) rapidly, because it is more
(or less) segmented?
Before answering this question, several diﬃculties have to be overcome.
First, inequality is a multi-dimensional concept and it is impossible to say that "one society is more
unequal than another one", without further restrictions. Here we restrict our analysis so that we can use
the concept of Lorenz-dominance. We shall consider two equal sized societies S and e S,with two sequences












a n ds u c ht h a tL0 is Lorenz-
dominating e L0. Because of this Lorenz-dominance, we can say that e S is more unequal than S.
Second, how to deﬁne (aggregate) growth in a segmented society, with autonomous clubs that may grow
at diﬀerent rates? Here we use the following deﬁnition: we deﬁne the aggregate growth rate of an economy S





t. We are interested in the comparison of the aggregate growth rates for two economies,
when they have reached their permanent partition and the steady states have been reached. The limit growth








Third, we have to deﬁne an increase in segmentation. Following HJKM, we we shall use the following
Deﬁnition 1 As o c i e t yS is (weakly) more segmented in period t than a society e S if the number of non-
residual clubs in the core partition b Ct associated with S, J −1, is at least equal to the number of non-residual
clubs in the core partition e b Ct associated with e S,e J −1, and the j-th club in SE2 is never larger than the j-th
club in SE1, for j<J 1.




? Can we order these two aggregate growth rates? Actually
the answer to this question is no, as we are able to make the following
Claim 9. Assuming two diﬀerent inequality schedules such that S Lorenz-dominates e S, as o c i e t yS
associated with S does not necessarily grow more rapidly than e S associated with e S.
Proof. See appendix.
It appears that even we take into consideration the fact that agents form clubs and therefore that society
is segmented due to the presence of congestion costs, we cannot obtain an unambigous relationship between
inequality and growth.
The proof rests on the simple case where the two inequality schedules are such that the permanent core-
partitions are immediately reached, with equal sized clubs, with S being weakly more segmented than e S. In
this simple case, it is obvious to show that the congestion function plays a role such that it may overcome
the impact of diﬀerent club sizes. This explains the claim. The lesson is that inequality is not the sole cause
of diﬀerences in (long term) growth rates: the way agents form communities and the resulting congestion
eﬀects cannot be neglected. It is unlikely that empirical studies can ﬁnd an unambigous undisputable link
between inequality and growth.
It would be interesting to obtain the same ambiguous result in less restrictive cases. Our view is that it
should be supported in these more complex cases.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we oﬀer a method to study the socio-economic dynamics of societies, based on coalition theory.
We develop a view on the growth process, taking fully into account the fact that agents form communities,
and that the borders nor the shape of a growing economy are given. Weith explicit and rigourous micro-
foundations, we are able to cast a new light where the segmentation of an economy and its dynamic play a
critical role in the growth process itself. The economic and social dynamics constantly interact and cannot
be separated: growth alters the way society is segmented, segmentation itself aﬀects the way the durable
factor accumulates and growth develops.
We prove the existence of a socio-economic equilibrium period after period, leading to a steady state. This
steady-state is not necessarily characterized by economic convergence unless the society eventually forms a
unique community.
Complex as it may appear, the model we use is relatively simple. Several extensions are worth investi-
gating.
The ﬁrst one should be to introduce interclub externalities, such as aggregate human capital, for example.
Inter-coalitions spillovers are a diﬃcult issue in coalition theory. However, here this could be done without
too much diﬃculties, as we can play on diﬀerent dates.5
A limitation of the model is that the ranking of individuals/families is not modiﬁed over time. In the real
world, we witness much less stability. And family trajectories may cross over time. An interesting approach
5We owe this suggestion to Fernando Jaramillo.
16to this question would be to introduce shocks to human capital and look at the amount of shocks necessary
to ensure that there is eventual convergence over time.
We relied on a simple endogenous growth mechanism, based on human capital à la Lucas (1988). Other
mechanisms are able to generate endogenous growth, linked to various externalities, and can be linked to the
gathering of individuals, working together or sharing some resources. It would be interesting to apply the
endogenous formation of communities to these alternative frameworks. In particular, R&D clusters play a
role in Schumpeterian growth theory and appear to be quite empirically eﬀective: the consensus is that part
of the growth gap between the US and European countries is due to diﬀerences in the ﬁnancing and the use
of innovations. The relationship between technological communities and growth could be investigated using
the type of analysis developed here.
Here ﬁnancial markets play no role. This is crucial as it assures that an individual can only rely on his
club’s mates for growing. Finance in many ways can be seen as a way to overcome physical barriers. At the
same time, we know how segmented is the ﬁnancial sphere and that ﬁnancial clubs exist.
Finally, congestion is linked to the mere number of agents in a club, not to their characteristics. It would
be worth to explore the dynamic consequences of non anonymous crowding out.
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17APPENDIX
A Proof of Proposition 1.
1. P r o o fo f( i ) .

















There is unanimity across time, clubs and agents. Hence the solution is b τ =
ρβ
1+ρβ.
2. P r o o fo f( i i ) .
Replacing (15) in (1), and using (2) and (3), the indirect utility function for agent i in coalition b C
j
t can




































The core partition exists following Farrell and Scotchmer’s (1985) proof of their theorem.6
3. Proof of (iii).
Since (6) is increasing in the individual human capital and decreasing in the size of the clubs, the proof
of the consecutivity property is identical to Proposition 1’s in JKM (2003).
The proof of uniqueness is as follows. Consider a consecutive club whose richest member i is endowed
with ht and the poorest i with ht. An agent i∗ is admitted in a consecutive club C
j
t, formed with n
j
t members,








































Since the ﬁrst term in brackets is monotonously decreasing with the membership in a club and the second
term in brackets is monotonously increasing with n
j
t,g i v e nt h ea s s u m p t i o nw em a d eo nc o n g e s t i o nc o s t s ,
there is a unique individual i such that (16) is true for any i,i ≤ i ≤ i and untrue for i <i .The uniqueness
of the core partition follows.
4. P r o o fo f( i v ) .
6See also Konishi, Sönmez et al. (2002).
18Consider b C1
t , b C2
t and the consecutive club C1
t deﬁned as: {1,....,i∗} with i∗ = b n2
t. Since they belong to










t, we deduce that:
V i(b C1
t ) >Vi(C1
t ) >Vi(b C2
t ).
T h es a m ea r g u m e n tm a yb er e p e a t e df o ra n yb Ci
t and b C
i+1
t . This completes the proof of (iv).
B Proof of Proposition 3.
1. P r o o fo f( i ) .A ta n yd a t et, consider two individuals i and i0 with i0 >i, i ∈ b C
j
























2. Proof of (ii). Given the welfare ordering property of the core partition, b G
j
t ≥ b G
j0
t for j ≤ j0. This implies
that, for i0 >i, i ∈ b C
j
t and i0 ∈ b C
j0



























This equation means that the ordering of individuals according to wealth remains unaltered through
time.
C Proof of Proposition 4.
Step 1. We focus on the ﬁrst clubs of the successive (i.e. over time) core partitions. We prove in this step




Consider the “initial” pivotal agent p1
0 of the “initial” ﬁrst club b C1
0. We can prove that he will always






, i.e. the size of the ﬁrst club can only (weakly) increase. This
is true if the two following properties are satisﬁed:
(i) for any t>0,Vp1
0(b C1
t ) >Vp1
0(£), where £ is any club in S : this comes directly from the property of
the core partition and the welfare ordering.








Let us start from the deﬁnition of the initial pivotal agent p1




























































































0 is accepted in b C1
1. By recurrence, this is true for b C1
t . This implies that once agent p1
0 lives in the same
club with richer agents in the initial period 0, he will be always accepted by them at any date t.T h i sp r o v e s
(18).
Step 2. We now prove that there exists a e t1 such that b n1
0 ≤ b n1
t = b n1
t+1 ≤ N, ∀t>e t1. From Step 1, we
know that n1
t ≥ n1
t−1, ∀t>0. Hence, either there exists e t1 such that b n1
t = b n1
t+1 <N ,∀t>e t1, or not. If not,
there exist dates t∗
1 such that b n1
t∗
1 < b n1
t∗
1+1 ≤ N . But since max(b n1
t)=N, this implies that there exists a
t∗∗
1 such that b n1
t = N, ∀t ≥ t∗∗
1 . T h i sc o m p l e t e st h ep r o o fo fS t e p2a n dp r o v e st h a ta ts o m eﬁnite date e t1, a
constant b C1 = b C1
t ,∀t>e t1, forms.
Step 3. We now prove that as long as the ﬁrst club has not reached his permanent conﬁguration, some
clubs cannot have reached theirs. From Step 1, if b C1
t 6= b C1, then ∃b t,t ≤ b t<e t1, such that p1
b t >p 1
b t−1. The
consecutivity property implies, that p1
b t−1 +1, which at time b t−1belonged to b C2
b t−1, belongs at date b t to b C1
b t .
Hence, since b C2
b t−1 6= b C2
b t , then b C2
b t−1 6= b C2.
Step 4.S t a r t i n ga tt ≥ e t1, consider b C2
t . This club is the ﬁrst club of the subset b Ct\b C1 of the successive
core partitions of b Ct\b C1. Hence, we can apply the previous steps 1-3, and deduce that there exists a date
e t2 ≥ e t1 that b n2
e t2 ≤ b n2
t = b n2
t+1 ≤ N, ∀t>e t2 and therefore b C2
t = b C2,∀t>e t2.
[Beware: this does not mean that the individuals belonging to b C1 behave in isolation from the rest of
society from e t1 on and do not interact anymore with the rest of society. At any date, these agents remake
their decisions about accepting new members in the ﬁrst club, but they always answer negatively. Hence, the
size and membership of the second club can only vary by accepting new poorer members from subsequent
clubs, as its members have no interest in reducing C20
t s size.]
Step 5. Using a similar reasoning for the following clubs, we sequentially obtain permanent clubs b Cj, until
a date t∗, where all clubs have reached their permanent conﬁguration. The t∗ − permanent core partition
then obtains.
Let us show that t∗ is unique. First, let us focus on the ﬁrst club. Suppose by contradiction that there
are two dates e t1 and e e t1, e t1 >e e t1, such that:
(i) For any t>e t1, b C1
t = b C1, b C1 ⊂ b Ct,
(ii) For any t>e e t1, b C1
t = b C1, b C1 ⊂ b Ct.
Hence, for t with e t1 ≤ t ≤ e e t1, there are two permanent ﬁrst clubs, contradicting the uniqueness property
of the core-partition.
Second, the same argument applies for any higher indexed club. Hence, this leads to a unique t∗.¥
20D Proof of Proposition 5.
1. P r o o fo f( i ) .A tt h et∗ −permanent core partition, for two individuals i and i0 with i0 >iand i,i0 ∈ b Cj,


















and thus, limt→∞ hi










































Using (19), (11) obtains.
3. Proof of (iii). Suppose there is more than 1 club in the t∗ − permanent core partition. If γj <γ j0
,j<
j0. But, then lim
t→∞hj0
=l i m
t→∞hj which contradict the pivotal agent condition and there cannot be more
than one club. Then, given (11), nj ≥ nj0
,j<j0 implies γj ≥ γj0
,j<j0.
E Proof of Proposition 6.
Let us ﬁrst characterize the core partition of a society S with the inequality schedule S = {λ0,...,λ0}.































































































The conditions for deﬁning a pivotal agent of a given club are identical for any club, as they do not depend on
any level of human capital. Hence, whatever j ∈ {1,...,J − 1}, b n
j
0 = b n
j−1
0 . Then the proof of this proposition
follows from the proof of Proposition 7 using this equality.
F Proof of Proposition 7.
1. Proof of (i)











0 ,∀i ∈ S.
21According to Proposition 3 of JKM [2003], we know that whatever j ∈ {1,...,J − 1}, b n
j









0 , ∀i ∈ S.


































































































Step 1: We show that C0 = C1. This amounts to show that whatever j the agent p
j
0+1is still not accepted















































Between date 0 and date 1, for two individuals i and i0 (i0 >i ) and i,i0 ∈ b C
j












































































































































































































































































































By the deﬁnition of the core partition and b n
j+1
0 < b n
j

































































































































































Hence, (24) is satisﬁed.










Let us consider two individuals i and i0 (i0 >i ) both belonging at date t − 1 to b C
j
0 since date t =0 . We
























Now we check whether individual p
j
0 +1who was excluded from club b C
j
0 at date t−1 is still excluded at


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































By the deﬁnition of the core partition and that b n
j+1
0 < b n
j

































































































































































































































































































































and (27) and hence (26) are satisﬁed. This completes the proof of (i).
Remark that (28) in the long run is consistent with Prop.5 (11). It implies that γj >γ j0
, ∀j,j0.
2. Proof of (ii)
Given that b C0 = b Cj, it is immediate that b n
j
















































































































Given (??), this ratio is equal to 1.
253. Proof of (iii).
Assume that for a given λ0 and a given A(.), the optimal size is n0. Hence p
j
0 = n0 is the ﬁrst pivotal
agent. Assume that e A(.) is suﬃciently steeper than A(.) so that the ﬁrst pivotal agent is changed to e p
j
0.
Given the inequalities deﬁning the pivotal agent, e p
j
0 cannot be higher than p
j
0.
This is true for any club, given the equal size property. Extending the reasoning for any period completes
the proof.
A similar reasoning applies to a bigger λ0.
G Proof of Proposition 8.











0 ,∀i ∈ S.
According to Proposition 3 of JKM [2003], we know that in this case, whatever j ∈ {1,...,J − 1},
b n
j+1
0 ≥ b n
j
0.


































































































We show that the case b C0 6= b C1 cannot be ruled out. This amounts to show that the agent p
j
0 +1may be
accepted by club j at date t =1 , that is that we cannot prove that inequality (23) is systematically satisﬁed.






































































































26we cannot prove that (24) is satisﬁed. A similar reasoning applies to any period t.
We can construct an example which proves that b C0 6= b C1. We consider an economy with 6 agents and the
following initial distribution of human capital:
h6
0 = 50.142
1.2 =4 1 .785,h 5
0 = 65.185
1.3 =5 0 .142,h 4
0 = 88
1.35 =6 5 .185,h 3
0 =8 8 ,h 2
0 =1 2 0 ,h 1
0 =7 2 0 . This




0 ,∀i ∈ S
The structural parameters have the following values: κ =1 0 ,µ= .5,β= .5,ρ= .5,a=1 /10.
1 - We construct the core partition b C0,starting with the ﬁrst club of the ﬁrst period b C1
0. Using the
















Agent 3 is then the richest member of the second club b C1
0. Agent 4 is accepted by agent 3, agent 5 by agents






















Finally, b C0 is formed of the two clubs {1,2} and {3,4,5,6}.
Now we consider the next core partition b C1. First we compute the individual human capitals available at
















=6 4 2 .37
h3
1 =8 8 0 ( .5).5
µ
.1
(41.785 + 50.142 + 65.185 + 88)
(exp.4)88
¶.5
=2 6 8 .87
Then we remark that agent 3 is now accepted by agents 1 and 2 in b C1
1 as:






=2 3 3 .05.
This suﬃces to prove that in this economy b C0 6= b C1.
27H Proof of claim 9.





0 ,∀i ∈ S, e λ
i,i+1
0 = e λ
i+1,i+2
0 ,∀i ∈ e S. In both societies, the core partitions are characterized by equal
size clubs, and since S is weakly less segmented than e S, J ≤ e J and e n ≤ n. M o r e o v e r ,w ea s s u m et h a tS and
e S are such that there exists no residual clubs in any of the two core partitions. Hence nJ = e n e J = N






























This ratio is larger than 1 if A(.) has an elasticity lower than 1. This completes the proof.
28